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Article 8, Proportionality and Horizontal Effect 
 
After the controversial decision in McDonald v McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049; 
[2015] Ch. 357, the Supreme Court has now delivered its judgment [2016] UKSC 28; 
[2016] 3 W.L.R. 45. The Supreme Court held that in actions for possession between 
private parties, although article 8 is engaged, no proportionality assessment is 
required, at least where an underlying statutory provision is itself compliant. 
 
This note will consider four issues arising from the judgment: the relevance of 
contractual arrangements and statutory interventions to questions of horizontal effect; 
the consequences of article 8 being engaged; the mechanisms of horizontal effect; and 
the need to balance article 8 and article 1 protocol 1. It will be seen that despite the 
brief and simple-seeming judgment, delivered by Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale 
(with whom the rest of the Court agreed), there are as many issues raised by this 
judgment as are solved. 
 
The case concerned an action for possession against a tenant by receivers appointed 
by a mortgage lender. The tenant, Ms McDonald, had severe psychological problems 
such that it would be extremely disruptive to her well-being for her to lose her home. 
Her parents acquired the freehold to the property with the help of a mortgage and fell 
into arrears. Ms McDonald argued that whilst section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988, 
on its face, allowed the receiver to obtain an order for possession in these 
circumstances, the interference with her article 8 right would thereby be 
disproportionate.  
 
The trial judge held that he was unable to consider article 8 and the proportionality of 
any order for possession. The Court of Appeal agreed for two key reasons. First, the 
ECtHR jurisprudence did not require that article 8 have horizontal effect, and without 
such jurisprudence, common law would not allow for a proportionality assessment (at 
[19(1)]). Secondly, the decision in Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community 
Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595; [2002] Q.B. 48 required the 
Court to conclude that section 21 was Convention compliant (at 19(iii(]).  
 
The Supreme Court outlined three questions which required to be answered (at [1]). 
First, when considering an action for possession by and against a private landlord and 
tenant, should the court consider the proportionality of eviction in light of article 8? 
Secondly, if so, could section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988 be read in such a way as 
to allow such an assessment? Finally, was the action for possession in this case in fact 
proportionate? The Court concluded that the answer to the first question was no, and 
so the remaining two issues were no longer strictly relevant (at [60]). This case note 
will therefore focus on the Court’s answer to the first question.  
 
The Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to consider the proportionality of 
the order for possession because: (a) absent any binding jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
a landlord’s right to obtain possession in these circumstances (here, the mortgagee 
had appointment receivers who, strictly speaking, become agents of the landlord) was 
governed by statute and contract and thus the Court should not interfere with the 
balance struck between occupiers and landlords (at [40]); and (b) whilst there is some 
support in the Strasbourg jurisprudence for the proposition that article 8 is engaged in 
these circumstances, there is no requirement that a proportionality test be carried out 
(at [59]). Both of these conclusions are doubtful.  
 
At the heart of the Court’s conclusion is the view that where the rights and obligations 
of private parties are determined by statute and/or contract, it is not the role of the 
court to interfere with that balance (at [40]-[46]). That reasoning is strange. First, the 
potentially relevant statutory provisions must, on any view, include the impact of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 since this is precisely what the interpretation obligation in 
the HRA is intended to achieve. This must be true even where “the effect of those 
statutes has… been effectively confirmed on a number of occasions by Parliament”  
(at [40]) since all of these ‘confirmations’ took place against the background of the 
1998 Act. This argument is not conclusive as to outcome, but it does mean that we 
ought not to assume that Parliament ‘intends’ for the balance between the rights of the 
occupier and the landlord to be governed by the Housing Act 1988 alone, but possibly 
by that Act modified by controls which provide for human rights protection where 
appropriate.  
 
Furthermore, the Court reasons that:  
although it may well be that article 8 is engaged when a judge makes an order 
for possession of a tenant’s home at the suit of a private sector landlord, it is 
not open to the tenant to contend that article 8 could justify a different order 
from that which is mandated by the contractual relationship between the 
parties, at least where, as here, there are legislative provisions which the 
democratically elected legislature has decided properly balance the competing 
interests of private sector landlords and residential tenants. (At [40]). 
This line of reasoning is, with respect, puzzling. Either the justification for not 
considering the proportionality of the order lies with the fact that the rights and 
obligations are privately negotiated in the form of contractual rights and obligations 
freely chosen (so that the court would be interfering with a ‘private’ relationship and 
therefore overstepping its proper role), or the justification lies in the fact that a 
democratic legislature has decided the balance and has therefore decided to ‘override’ 
the ability of the court to assess whether this balance is compliant with a different 
statute enacted by Parliament. It is problematic to argue that interference with 
contractual rights produces an impermissible (species of) horizontal effect, whilst at 
the same time arguing that the reason why no interference is possible is that 
Parliament, the supreme organ of the state, has specified the balance to be struck 
between those parties. If statute governs the relationship, then it is one produced by 
the state, and if a court order is sought, it is enforced by the state. It is no longer a 
purely private relationship.  
 
The strangeness of the court’s approach in this regard can be seen again when their 
Lordships reason:  
It would be unsatisfactory if a domestic legislature could not impose a general 
set of rules protecting residential tenants in the private sector without thereby 
forcing the state to accept a super-added requirement of addressing the issue 
of proportionality in each case where possession is sought. In the field of 
proprietary rights between parties neither of whom is a public authority, the 
state should be allowed to lay down rules which are of general application, 
with a view to ensuring consistency of application and certainty of outcome. 
Those are two essential ingredients of the rule of law, and accepting the 
appellant’s argument in this case would involve diluting those rules in relation 
to possession actions in the private rented sector. (At [43]). 
If the State is laying down rules of general application, then it is already interfering 
with the private rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant, whether certainty, or 
‘fairness’ in a broader sense is the aim, and in doing so, is potentially invoking the 
‘super-added’ protection of its own legislative act in the form of the HRA. This may 
produce uncertainty, but if the rules genuinely interfere with an individual’s human 
rights by rendering them homeless in a disproportionate way, then surely this is not 
necessarily trumped by a plea to certainty. These two considerations may be balanced 
by the proportionality test, not in the question as to whether or not one is required. 
The court’s assessment that the proper role of the court prevents a proportionality 
assessment in these circumstances is, therefore, unconvincing. 
 
Furthermore, although the Court acknowledged that article 8 is engaged (since an 
individual was deprived of their home, at [50]), their Lordships held that no 
proportionality test should be carried out. However, article 8 itself requires a 
proportionality assessment to determine whether the rights it embodies have been 
breached. This is not a matter of judicial precedent, but interpretation of the articles 
within the Convention as mandated by the HRA. The second problem with this line of 
reasoning is that it mirrors that in R v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43; [2004] 1 A.C. 983. The 
argument runs that where statutory provisions are, in general, compliant with the 
HRA, every time that provision is relied upon, the outcome must also be 
proportionate. There is an appealing logic to this approach. However, it has already 
been rejected, albeit in a different context, by the ECtHR in Kay v UK (2012) 54 
E.H.R.R. 30; [2011] H.L.R. 2, leading to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach in 
Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011] UKSC 6; [2011] 2 W.L.R. 220 and 
Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 A.C. 186. If this approach was 
wrong in Qazi, it is difficult to see why it should be right here notwithstanding the 
change in the identity of the landlord.  
 
A further reason given by the court to support their conclusion that no proportionality 
assessment be carried out was that such an assessment would provide a perverse 
incentive to landlords to resort to self-help methods of eviction (at [42]). Whilst it is 
true, as the court highlights, that some types of residential occupiers are not protected 
by the Protection of Eviction Act 1977 (at [42]), most such occupiers are protected. 
Furthermore, we might assume that if the 1977 Act does not provide sufficient 
protection, then those statutory provisions themselves may breach human rights.  
 
These reasons do not therefore support the Supreme Court’s conclusion. The 
recognition that article 8 is engaged, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the Supreme 
Court in relation to public authorities, and of the wording of article 8 itself, as 
incorporated into national law by the HRA, mandate that a proportionality assessment 
be carried out. The Court’s concerns about the proper judicial role and the balance 
struck between occupier and landlord should filter into this proportionality test under 
the concept of the margin of appreciation or deference. They do not justify that no 
assessment be carried out. 
 
The Court was, nevertheless, minded to reject the article 8 argument unless 
Strasbourg jurisprudence required them to do otherwise. The Court, in examining this 
jurisprudence, is more thorough in their analysis than had been the Court of Appeal, 
but the analysis is still problematic. It is possible to distinguish almost any form of 
precedent if so desired. That is what the Supreme Court appears to do here. What it 
does not do is acknowledge the ‘tone’ and sense of the ECtHR’s judgments. For 
example, in discussing Zehenter v Austria (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 22, the Supreme Court 
distinguishes between orders for possession and “statutorily created powers of a court 
to enforce debts owed to creditors by ordering the sale of the debtor’s assets, 
including her home” (at [51]). In the context of the significant structural question of 
the horizontal applicability of article 8, this is a distinction without a difference.  
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court acknowledges that the Strasbourg jurisprudence does 
support a finding that article 8 is engaged (at [50]). However, they argue, this does not 
mean that a proportionality assessment must be carried out. Thus, in relation to 
Zehenter,  
The furthest this decision goes in assisting the appellant is to support the 
notion that article 8 is engaged whenever a court determines a tenancy of 
residential property and makes an order for possession. However, once again, 
the decision does not support the notion that article 8 can be invoked by a 
residential occupier to curb her private sector landlord’s reliance on its 
contractual right to possession, where the statutory regime according her a 
degree of protection is not said to infringe the Convention. (At [51]). 
What, if anything, does the fact of article 8’s being engaged therefore require if not 
assessment as to whether the article 8 was breached? The court does not answer this 
question, and it flies, as has been highlighted above, in the face of what article 8, and 
therefore the HRA, demand. 
 
Finally, their Lordships, in assessing the Strasbourg jurisprudence, repeatedly reason 
that a case is not of assistance to them because the relevant signatory State did not 
contest the applicability of article 8 (at [51], [52], [53]). Whilst this means that the 
Strasbourg court has not definitively pronounced that article 8 does have horizontal 
effect in actions for possession against a private tenant, this may be because the 
accepted legal position in these signatory States is that article 8 is so engaged. The 
failure to contest its applicability is not evidence that it is not applicable.  
 
There are, therefore, difficulties with almost all aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning, and, as with the Court of Appeal, this is arguably caused by a failure to 
engage fully with the mechanisms of horizontal effect, the impact of policy-based 
statutory provisions in private law, and the proper role of the Court in policing such 
issues. In particular, the Court does not analyse precisely why and how a 
proportionality assessment might filter into the possession order process. As discussed 
elsewhere, horizontal effect can take many forms (see E Lees, ‘Horizontal effect and 
article 8: McDonald v McDonald’ (2015) 131 LQR 34). In this particular case, the 
court was not asked to construct for Ms McDonald an independent cause of action 
based on her article 8 rights. They were asked to interpret a statutory provision to be 
in line with those rights. Thus, given that an action for possession under section 21(4) 
engages article 8 rights by depriving an individual of their home, as both the 
Strasbourg Court and the Supreme Court here acknowledge, in order to comply with 
the Convention the court must examine the proportionality of that deprivation. It is 
not the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which requires this, it is section 3 of the HRA 
1998. If that is not possible because of the wording of the statutory provisions, the 
Court must make a declaration of incompatibility but must apply the statute anyway. 
This is a requirement of section 4 of the HRA. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is, in 
this sense, a secondary consideration. First and foremost, this situation is determined 
by the provisions of the HRA. 
 
If, as is clear from the wording of section 21(4), the provision cannot be interpreted so 
as to allow a proportionality assessment, the next issue is whether the Court must 
construct a caveat to the mandatory possession order for which section 21(4) 
provides. This would indeed be outside the proper role of the court. The HRA 
explicitly does not allow a court to dis-apply statute following a finding that it 
breaches an individual’s human rights. The Convention does not have direct common 
law horizontal effect in breach of existing statute and so the Court would contravene 
the HRA if it were to create such a caveat which contradicted the mandatory wording 
of the HA 1988.  
 
There is one aspect of the judgment however which may provide impetus for open 
consideration of this structural issue. The Court recognises that if article 8 does have 
horizontal effect, of whatever type, then the landlord’s article 1 protocol 1 rights will 
also become relevant (at [39]). This, in turn, will require a balancing of the two rights. 
The Court recognises the difficulty of doing this in practical terms (at [41]). However, 
there is a more significant problem with carrying out such a balancing exercise. The 
ECHR and HRA do not envisage horizontal effect in their wording. All human rights 
rank equal. There is therefore no mechanism for balancing such rights within the 
ECHR itself, and one will need to be constructed. Secondly, and more importantly, 
article 1 protocol 1 rights are problematic because of the so-called ‘inherent 
limitation’ argument (see A Goymour, ‘Property and Housing’ in D Hoffman, The 
Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2011) 276): 
since the landlord’s rights were always subject to the human rights of the tenant, and 
all article 1 protocol 1 protects is pre-existing legal rights (as opposed to a factual 
state of affairs as does article 8), in fact there is no breach of article 1 protocol 1 by 
giving effect to a tenant’s article 8 right. Whether or not this argument holds true (in 
this author’s opinion, it must, as there is no principled way of either creating a 
‘perfect’ reversionary right which exists in a vacuum absent a tenant, or of arbitrarily 
excluding some considerations, such as human rights, from the scope of that 
reversionary right for the purposes of article 1 protocol 1), it raises questions of what 
function article 1 protocol 1 can in fact play. The failure of the Supreme Court to 
consider this issue in Sims v Dacorum [2014] UKSC 63; [2015] A.C. 1336 and here, 
means that we still await judicial discussion of the mechanisms of horizontal effect, 
the impact on this on private property rights, and the scope of article 1, protocol 1. 
 
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court does not discuss this issue. Ultimately, the 
right result was reached; section 21(4) does not allow for a proportionality 
assessment. It is mandatory in its wording. It is therefore incompatible with article 8, 
and the Court ought to have made a declaration to that effect. This declaration would 
not have availed Ms McDonald however, since the Court is not permitted by the HRA 
to construct a common law defence for her in the face of the non-compliant statutory 
provisions. However, as with the Court of Appeal, the judgment provides no 
resolution, leaving the role of human rights in private law as uncertain as before. By 
failing to consider the different types of horizontal effect, and by instead focusing on 
the identity of the parties to the action, the Supreme Court fails to resolve the 
important structural issues to which this case gives rise. 
 
